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1. INTRODUCTION
Johnson’s analysis of what he terms the Triumvirate View and its accompanying
Tripartite Distinction raises several critical concerns that merit review. My purpose in this
commentary is to reconceptualize the value-added nature of Wenzel’s original project,
and to suggest where its greatest utility may lie. With respect to the primary focus of
Johnson’s argument, I’m inclined to agree with some of the reservations being advanced.
However, there are some qualifications that I would place on outright acceptance of the
position taken.
The analysis appropriately credits Wenzel for providing an approach to argument
that has merited attention by a number of scholars. While I would not rely on a Google
search as the primary evidence for its importance, as there are multiple sources not
referenced by that search engine, it is nonetheless the case that the Triumvirate has had a
strong impact on argument studies.
My approach will be to first chronicle some of that influence in an area not cited
by Johnson. What I will argue is that, irrespective of the faults Johnson cites (assuming
for the moment that they are in fact fatal flaws), the LDR trio and its distinctive nature as
product, process, procedure has a strong pedagogical utility. Wenzel’s framing of
argument functions, as I hope to explain later, as a convenient fiction. However lax its
particulars in sustaining distinctions, it remains a highly convenient way to address broad
contours of argument for undergraduates. With this review in hand, I will then turn to a
more focused review of specific claims made with respect to the flawed character of the
theoretical frame.
2. A PEDAGOGICAL JUSTIFICATION
Although not aimed at undergraduates, I want to begin with a source Johnson cites.
Christopher Tindale (1999) frames his text, Acts of Arguing, in the same manner as
Johnson with respect to an early reliance on Aristotle and Perelman. He adopts the same
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frame in his 2004 Rhetorical Argumentation. The definitions he provides are a useful
starting point in laying out the manner in which the Triumvirate has been conceived:
The logical emphasizes the product of statements collected in the relationship of premises and
conclusions […]
The dialectical sense of argument focuses attention on the argumentative exchanges within a
dialogue and the moves that might be involved. There are several dialogues of interest, such as the
quarrel, the negotiation, the debate, or the inquiry […]
The third division is the rhetorical, which emphasizes argument as a process. Here attention is
paid to the means used in argumentative communications between arguer and audience. (pp. 4-5)

One might note the rather loose use of ‘dialogue’ in the consideration of dialectic
argument above—a concern that I suspect Johnson and I share. I’ll return to the
dialogue/dialectic distinction at a later point.
Inch and Warnick (2010) address the same issues in their introduction to what
they term a “co-orientational view of argument” in this manner:
These are not three different kinds of arguments, they are three different ways of looking at
argumentation. Each perspective emphasizes a different set of functions
and
features
of
argumentation […]
The logical perspective asks, “Is the argument sound?” The dialectical perspective asks, “Has the
discussion been handled so as to achieve a candid and critical examination of all aspects of the
issue in question?” And the rhetorical perspective asks, “Has the arguer constructed the argument
so as to successfully influence a particular audience?” All three perspectives are useful and
necessary, and the significance of any one perspective at any time depends on the arguer’s purpose
and the situation in which the argument is made. (p. 35)

What is most significant in their approach is that “perspective” is operationalized in terms
of a general question that frames the primary function of each separate entity. In addition,
context and purpose and its impact on the relative importance of any one perspective is
clearly addressed.
Karen and Donald Rybacki (2004) also frame their introduction to the historical
development of argument in terms of Wenzel’s distinctions:
We can think of these three perspectives as […] three different ways of understanding how
argumentation functions as an instrument of communication. Each gives us a different focus on the
structure and use of argumentation, and […] of what is meant by “good” argumentation.
First, the rhetorical perspective explores how we use communication to influence or change others
[…]
Second, the dialectical perspective explores the structure of conversations. […] [It] is a plan for
interaction in which all sides of an issue or opinion are raised and resolved through discussion.
Third, the logical perspective offers a series of formal rules for distinguishing sound arguments
from unsound ones. (pp. 7-8)

Note that their reference to logic restricts its field of operation to formal reasoning—a
move that ignores the work done by informal logicians and others to broaden the domain
in meaningful ways. Although I and others might wish a broader view had been taken,
they are following a highly traditional orientation toward the perspectives.
Richard Rieke, Malcolm Sillars and Tarla Rai Peterson (2009) offer a slightly
different approach to the same basic set of distinctions. Although they do not cite
Wenzel, their reference to an earlier work by Daniel O’Keefe (1977) reminds us that the
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conversation around “process” and “product” predates Wenzel’s work—a conversation
he was quite familiar with as he developed his own conceptual frame. O’Keefe (1977)
suggested there are two “senses” of argument: Argument1 and Argument2. Argument1 is
perceived as the product of argument—a claim plus a reason—which constitutes a
specific “communicative act” (p. 121). Argument2 is the process-oriented view of
argument—what Rieke, Sillars, and Peterson reference as “argumentation” or the
engagement in arguing between people (p. 9). They go on to distinguish (following
Montgomery and Baxter’s (1998) ‘relational dialectics’ model) dialogue as the internal
facet they name “critical thinking” from the external facet they term “dialectics” (pp. 1317).
The foregoing should be sufficient in noting that the idea behind Wenzel’s
attempt to coordinate the relationship among logic, dialectic and rhetoric is alive and well
in contemporary argumentation textbooks aimed at undergraduates. They share, with
Tindale, what might be termed broad brush strokes across the three domains as a means
of indicating their relevance in the study of argument. Having used these texts in teaching
argumentation, I can also attest to their utility in demarcating, at a broad level, the
respective orientations of each as they impact what will be involved in building and
evaluating arguments as the course progresses. It is for this reason that I employ the
phrase “convenient fiction.” However fictional the actual distinctions are when subjected
to close scrutiny—do they stand up under critical examination?—they are a convenient
“peg” on which to hang one’s differentiation of conceptual frames.
3. A PERSPECTIVE ON PERSPECTIVES
Does perspective require a definition. While noting that the term is not clearly defined by
Wenzel, one might also ask—it is thus unclear? What is there about the term that is not
understood by its ordinary use in everyday contexts? A quick perusal of its multiple uses
does suggest the term is far more complex than a simple phrase would cover, such as “a
point of view.” While its etymology suggests a focus on sight—“to look through” or “see
clearly” (Miriam-Webster Online) other functions abound:
The state of existing in space before the eye
The state of one's ideas, the facts known to one, etc., in having a meaningful interrelationship
Of or pertaining to the art of perspective, or represented according to its laws.
A view or vista
A mental view or outlook
The relationship of aspects of a subject to each other and to a whole
Subjective evaluation of relative significance; a point of view. (Dictionary.com)

Given the multiple ways in which the term can be used in everyday discourse, it is
perhaps no wonder the question is raised. However, given the above, we can stipulate a
“perspective” on the term as an “orientation toward an object of inquiry.” Unlike
“method,” which presumes a specific pattern of actions or behaviours in relation to an
object or event, an orientation is a way of being in relation to that object or event. It is a
positionality or stance that might be expressed in terms of “starting point.” “From where
I stand […]” is one way of suggesting what the term represents. In fact, Wenzel (1990)
does offer his own “definition”—as he notes Brockreide’s explanation as “a strategy of
emphasis” and goes on to say:
3

RAYMIE E. McKERROW

It means attending to an object or a phenomenon from one point of view at a time so as to
highlight some feature in the foreground of our understanding while allowing other features to
recede into the background. It allows us to shift our viewpoint as our purposes and interests
require. (p. 11).

In this context, it is easier to see how the significance of either one of the three
variables—logic-dialectic-rhetoric—might be different. All are of equal importance at a
general level. This brings us to a second concern Johnson raises—what is meant by
“equal?”
If we accept the locution, borrowed from Aristotle, that we do not deliberate about
those things that are self evident, we might find an answer. I suspect the reason Wenzel
does not provide an argument supporting the suggestion “that these three perspectives are
of equal importance” (Johnson, p. 9) is precisely because it is a taken for granted
assumption. Wenzel was writing at a time when the discussion of the role of logic, as a
specific illustration, was undergoing a transformation within rhetorical studies writ large,
and argumentation theory (as discussed within communication departments) specifically.
This was due in large part to the work of Ehninger and Brockreide in bringing Toulmin’s
work to the field of study. My own work in seeing argument as “pragmatic justification”
(1990) was premised on that transformation as well. Thus, Wenzel was fully conversant,
as multiple references in the work we are reviewing attests, with the issues involved.
The key sentence in the quote above, in reference to this issue, suggests we “shift
our viewpoint as our purposes and interests require.” What this means is simply that no
one perspective is privileged as inherently more important than any other when applied
across all instances of argumentative discourse. What determines the relative need for any
one of the three perspectives is the end in view: why are we examining the argument?
What is our goal? Depending on the answer to that question, we have three broad, nondiscipline specific orientations to draw from. In any specific application, whether it is
essential to examine the artefact from all three perspectives will depend on the context
and our need to know (though it may be wise to do so in some instances). Whether this
response is equivalent to Johnsons’ “the most general and vaguest of senses” is arguable
(p. 7). I don’t happen to think so, but I can see why one might make that claim.
Perhaps this is an opportune moment to examine that claim in the context Johnson
offers it—as a way of noting that there is little to recommend “perspective” as a term
denoting much of anything substantive, as there is “no such thing as ‘the rhetorical
perspective,’ much less a ‘logical’ or ‘dialectical’ one. I understand the point being made,
as Johnson proceeds to “drill down” into the myriad ways each of these terms might be
employed with respect to their own complex assortment of particular emphases. We can,
for example, discuss textual or critical/cultural criticism as two relatively distinct
approaches within a ‘rhetorical’ mode of analysis. It is quite true that each of the terms
admits multiple meanings/uses, making a mockery, perhaps, of any attempt to generalize
broadly about the overarching role each possesses. A possible answer to Johnson, in
reclaiming the value-added nature of an appeal to these three terms, is to focus on
answers to questions that are ‘what’ or ‘why’ versus those that focus on ‘how.’ In
fleshing this out, I want to re-assert Wenzel’s own definitional claims:
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The rhetorical perspective directs our attention to the occurrence of arguing among people as a
natural communication process. (p. 15)
[T]he dialectical perspective calls up a procedural or methodological sense of argument. (p. 16)
[T]he special concerns of the logical perspective are with techniques for representing an argument
in a form amenable to criticism and with standards for evaluation. (p. 17)

My point is that each of these orientations responds initially to a question—what are we
interested in knowing, or why are we asking for more information about the specific
discourse instance? Once we determine the answer to this question, we can then focus on
which specific orientation is best able to answer the question. With that second answer in
hand, we can “drill down” into the morass of options or possibilities to select that which
more clearly addresses our goals. This might be, with respect to logic, a formal validity
assessment, or a consideration of the argument’s layout (Toulmin is implied here), or a
more ‘informal logic’ approach. The critical toolbox has multiple tools—each may
respond to a different sub-question relative to our specific purpose. To say that, is NOT to
say that the initial question is “vague” or relatively unimportant because of its own lack
of specificity. Whether the above statements adequately capture an ability to go more
deeply into any one orientation may be arguable. I would contend, in defending Wenzel’s
admittedly general observations, that each is a reasonable representation of a credible
“starting point” for more precise analysis. In fact, in the “logic” perspective noted above,
he goes on to cover formal, informal, Toulminesque approaches—without privileging any
one as the ultimate or superior approach.
A word on “process-procedure-product” may be helpful here—Johnson notes,
correctly, that within any one of the Triumvirate, as one engages its implications, one
finds themselves unavoidably enmeshed in the other terms. As he notes, process is
invoked when engaging dialectically in ways that determine what the product will look
like. When engaging rhetorically, one also examines how one speaks as well as what one
ends up saying. Nonetheless—I don’t think Wenzel would disagree with this, but might
well argue that, at the same time, the broad ‘parallels’ are still in place with respect to the
initial thought process that one invokes when moving from one orientation to another.
Where I think Johnson has the strongest argument is in the discussion of a much
maligned term—dialectic. I am not claiming that the assertion, for example, that dialectic
has become the dominant theme in argument studies, somehow grants it a privileged
status for all time. What counts as important in scholarship ebbs and flows across time—
at one time, formal reasoning occupied attention within argument texts in communication
studies departments. What I am suggesting is that the fact that one perspective is taken as
“basic” by any one theorist, or at any point in time, does not, by itself, invalidate the
general claim advanced by Wenzel.
As part of his analysis of dialectic, Johnson briefly notes the conflation of that
term with “dialogue.” While this is not the occasion for an extended discussion, I would
agree with the position taken. As further support, consider Bakhtin’s (1986) comment:
[67] Dialogue and dialectics. Take a dialogue and remove the voices […] remove the intonations
[…] carve out abstract concepts and judgments from living words and responses, cram everything
into one abstract consciousness—and that’s how you get dialectics. (ellipses in original; p. 181)

It is unfortunate that we’ve been as “sloppy” with respect to definition—and Johnson’s
own summary of the many uses of dialectics is a case in point. As a further example,
5
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Montgomery and Baxter’s (1998) sense of “relational dialectics,” drawing as it does from
Bakhtin, can be seen as continuing a pattern of conflating otherwise distinguishable
orientations to communicative interaction.
3. CONCLUSION
In bringing this response to a close, I want to return to the sense of “convenient fiction”
noted earlier. To the extent that one adopts Johnson’s position on the Triumvirate, a
pedagogical use of the concepts remains valuable. In adopting this phrase, one accepts the
difficulties involved in applying the concepts with precision, while still noting the
broadly conceived distinctive character of each as a point of view.
What I’ve tried to do, in dealing with the more specific criticism, is to suggest
how one might think about Wenzel’s overarching purpose in proposing the Triumvirate.
At that level of analysis, wherein one raises the initial question—what do I want to
know?—orients the person toward one (or more than one) perspective in seeking an
answer. It is simply a mechanism for advancing the idea that each has a contribution. It is
not a claim that, having exhausted the analytic possibilities of each, one has exhausted the
field. It is a claim that, in so doing, one has at least covered some critical issues with
respect to the justifiability of one’s claim on another’s attention.
Link to paper
REFERENCES
Bakhtin, M. (1986). Extracts from “Notes” (1970-1971). In: G. S. Morson (Ed.), Bakhtin: Essays and
Dialogues on His Work, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dictonary.com. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/perspective. Accessed May 15, 2009).
Inch, E. S. & Warnick, B. (2010). Critical Thinking and Communication: The use of reason in argument
(6th Ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
McKerrow, R. E. (1990). The centrality of justification: Principles of warranted assertability. In: D.
Williams & M. Hazen (Eds.), Argumentation Theory and the Rhetoric of Assent (pp. 17-32).
University, AL: University of Alabama Press.
Miriam Webster Online. http://jaguar.eb.com/dictionary/perspective. Accessed 5/15/09.
Montgomery, B. M. & Baxter, L. A. (1998). Dialectical approaches to studying personal relationships.
Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
O’Keefe, D. J. (1977). Two concepts of argument. Journal of the American Forensic Association 13, 121128.
Rieke, R. D., Sillars, M. O., & Peterson, T. R. ( 2009). Argumentation and Critical Decision Making (7th
Ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Rybacki, K. C. & Rybacki, D. J. (2004). Advocacy and Opposition: An introduction to argumentation (5th
Ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Tindale, C. W. (1999). Acts of Arguing: A rhetorical model of argument. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Tindale, C. W. (2004). Rhetorical Argumentation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Wenzel, J. (1990). Three perspectives on argument. In: R. Trapp and J. Schuetz (Eds.), Perspectives on
Argumentation: Essays in honor of Wayne Brockriede (pp. 9-16), Prospect Heights, IL:
Waveland.

6

